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Abstract
Afﬁliation has been a prominent assumption in the study of economic
modelswithstatisticaldependence. Despiteitslargenumberofapplications,
especially in auction theory, afﬁliation has limitations that are important to
be aware of. This paper shows that afﬁliation is a restrictive condition and
the intuition usually given for its adoption may be misleading. Also, other
usual justiﬁcations for afﬁliation are not compelling. Moreover, some impli-
cations of afﬁliation—namely, equilibrium existence in ﬁrst-price auctions
and the revenue dominance of second-price auctions—do not generalize to
other deﬁnitions of positive dependence.
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11 Introduction
Asymmetric information is a central theme in modern economics, not only in
game theory, but also in industrial organization, general equilibrium, group deci-
sion, ﬁnance and many other subdisciplines. Most models assume that each agent
privately knows a random variable, and these random variables are statistically
independent. Although independence is convenient for theoretical manipulations,
it is considered a restrictive and unrealistic assumption. Independence is regarded
as restrictive because it is satisﬁed by a “knife-edge” set of distributions, and un-
realistic because there are many potential sources of correlation in the real world:
media, education, culture or even evolution. Perceiving these limitations early on,
economists tried to surpass the mathematical difﬁculties and include statistical
dependence in their models.
The introduction of afﬁliation was a milestone in the study of dependence
in economics. This remarkable contribution was made by Milgrom and Weber
(1982a), who borrowed a statistical concept (multivariate total positivity of or-
der 2, MTP2) and applied it to a general model of symmetric auctions.1 Afﬁl-
iation is a generalization of independence—see its deﬁnition in section 2—that
was introduced through the appealing positive dependence intuition: “Roughly,
this [afﬁliation] means that a high value of one bidder’s estimate makes high val-
ues of the others’ estimates more likely” (Milgrom and Weber (1982a, p.1096)).
Among many important results, Milgrom and Weber (1982a), were able to show
that positive dependence (in the form of afﬁliation) does not create problem for
pure strategy equilibrium existence,2 but it affects in a clear way the revenue rank-
1In two previous papers, Milgrom (1981b) and Milgrom (1981a) presented results that used a
particular version of the concept, under the name “monotone likelihood ratio property” (MLRP).
It is also clear that Wilson (1969) and Wilson (1977) inﬂuenced the development of the afﬁliation
idea. Nevertheless, the concept was fully developed and the term afﬁliation ﬁrst appeared in Mil-
grom and Weber (1982a). See also Milgrom and Weber (1982b). When there is a density function,
the property had been previously studied by statisticians under different names. Lehmann (1966))
calls it Positive Likelihood Ratio Dependence (PLRD), Karlin (1968) calls it Total Positivity of
order 2 (TP2) for the case of two variables or Multivariate Total Positivity of Order 2 (MTP2) for
the multivariate case.
2Althoughequilibriainmixedstrategiesalwaysexist(JacksonandSwinkels(2005)), ﬁrst-price
auctions may fail to possess a pure strategy equilibrium when types are dependent. However, Mil-
grom and Weber (1982a) proved that afﬁliation ensures the existence of a symmetric monotonic
(increasing) pure strategy equilibrium (SMPSE) for symmetric ﬁrst-price auctions. Milgrom and
Weber (1982a) also proved the existence of equilibrium for second-price auctions with interde-
pendent values. In our setup (private values), the second-price auction always has an equilibrium
in weakly dominant pure strategies, which simply consists of bidding the private value.
2ing of auctions, that is, under afﬁliation, the English and the second-price auction
give higher expected revenue than the ﬁrst-price auction (in self-explanatory sym-
bols: RE > R2 > R1).3 These two results suggest an economic interpretation in
terms of comparative statics: when the assumption of independence is relaxed in
the direction of positive dependence, equilibrium is not a problem and the revenue
superiority of the English auction (and second-price auction) increases. From an
economic point of view this comparative statics exercise is very interesting, since
it clearly indicates what happens to the conclusion of the revenue equivalence
theorem (RET) when one of its assumptions is relaxed (from independence to
afﬁliation).4
Foraquarterofacentury, afﬁliationhasbeenpartofthefoundationsofauction
theory and almost synonymous with dependence in auctions. Afﬁliation’s mono-
tonicity properties (see Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Weber (1982a)) combine well
with natural properties of auctions, simplifying the analysis and allowing use-
ful predictions. But the success of afﬁliation is not restricted to auction theory.
Whenever information is important, afﬁliation may potentially be applied. In fact,
researchers in many different areas of economics and ﬁnance used the concept to
obtain useful results.5 In sum, few theoretical tools achieved as broad an impact
as afﬁliation.
However, as with any scientiﬁc achievement, afﬁliation has limitations. The
purpose of this paper is to assess afﬁliation (and its implications) as an enduring
foundation for a theory of dependence in economics.
The ﬁrst step of our analysis is the observation that Milgrom and Weber were
mainly interested in the setting of positive dependence of bidders’ valuations. We
recall that many different notions of positive dependence are available in the lit-
erature, but their rank is eventually not clear or sometimes even wrongly stated.
Section 3 deﬁnes seven different notions of positive dependence and establishes
3For private value auctions, which is the focus of this paper, English and second-price auctions
are equivalent, which implies RE = R2. See Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
4Besides independence, the RET requires other restrictive conditions, such as symmetry and
risk neutrality. The revenue ranking of auctions is undetermined if all those assumptions are re-
laxed. Thus, the importance of the result is akin to a comparative statistics exercise: holding
everything else ﬁxed, what changes if independence is relaxed in the direction of positive depen-
dence?
5For instance, Bergin (2001) used afﬁliation to obtain a generalization of a theorem by Aumann
(1976) for the aggregation of information by a set of individuals; Persico (2000) proved a theorem
about the usefulness of information for a decision maker under afﬁliation; and Sobel (2006) also
used afﬁliation to study aggregation of information by groups. This list represents just a very small
sample of papers; it would be almost impossible to cite all applications.
3a clear rank among them. It turns out that afﬁliation is the most restrictive one.
From this result, a natural question is: can Milgrom and Weber’s results be ex-
tended to weaker notions?
Section 4 focus on two of the main implications of afﬁliation—namely, equi-
librium existence and the revenue ranking between the ﬁrst and second price
auctions—and show that these implications can be slightly generalized in the
particular case of private values, but not much. Speciﬁcally, theorems 4.1 and
4.2 present the ﬁrst counterexamples of the failure of equilibrium existence and
Milgrom and Weber’s revenue ranking, respectively, under a familiar yet strong
concept of positive dependence: ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
These results suggest concerns about the applicability of the theory. If afﬁlia-
tion’s implications do not generalize, it is extremely important to verify whether
afﬁliation is typical or not. This is the theme of section 5. Subsection 5.1 shows
that afﬁliation is a very restrictive condition, that is, it shows that the set of af-
ﬁliated density functions is a meager set (the complement is open and dense in
the standard topology of continuous functions). Subsection 5.2 considers one of
the most used justiﬁcations for afﬁliation, namely, conditional independence and
shows that this justiﬁcation works only in special cases. Subsection 5.3 discusses
the justiﬁcations for the use of afﬁliation in other sciences.
From this, section 6 brieﬂy reviews the theoretical, experimental and empirical
literature on afﬁliation and observes that there is little support for afﬁliation on its
theory. All these observations suggest that we need novel approaches for dealing
with dependence in economics. Section 7 concludes with observations in this
direction. An appendix collects the proofs.
Although afﬁliation has a broad scope of application now, we will consider
mainly auctions as the benchmark ﬁeld of interest. Thus, we begin in the next
section by describing the standard auction model.
2 Basic model and deﬁnitions
As emphasized above, our main results are not restricted to auctions. However,
since afﬁliation’s main implications discussed in section 4 refer to auctions, we
will describe an auction model below.
There are n bidders, i = 1;:::;n. Bidder i receives private information ti 2 
t;t





n is adopted. The (private) values are distributed according to
4a pdf f :

t;t
n ! R+ which is symmetric. That is, if  : f1;:::;ng ! f1;:::;ng




. Let f (x) =
R
f (x;t i)dt i
be a marginal of f. Our main interest is the case where f is not the product
of its marginals, that is, the case where the types are dependent. We denote by
f (t i j ti) the conditional density f (ti;t i)=f (ti).
After knowing his value, bidder i places a bid bi 2 R+. He receives the object
if bi > maxj6=i bj. We consider both ﬁrst and second-price auctions with private
values. This means that the private information of each bidder (type) is also that
bidder’s value for the object. As Milgrom and Weber (1982a) show, second-price
and English auctions are equivalent in the case of private values, as we assume
here. In a ﬁrst-price auction, if bi > maxj6=i bj, bidder i’s utility is u(ti   bi) and
is u(0) = 0 if bi < maxj6=i bj. In a second-price auction, bidder i’s utility is
u(ti   maxj6=i bj) if bi > maxj6=i bj and u(0) = 0 if bi < maxj6=i bj. For both
auctions, ties are randomly broken.
A pure strategy is a function b : [0;1] ! R+, which speciﬁes the bid b(ti) for
each type ti. The interim payoff of bidder i, who bids  when his opponent j 6= i
follows b : [0;1] ! R+ is given by
i (ti;;b()) = u(ti   )F
 
b
 1 () j ti

= u(ti   )
Z b 1()
t
f (tj j ti)dtj;




u(ti   b(tj))f (tj j ti)dtj;
if it is a second-price auction.
Wefocusattentiononsymmetricmonotonicpurestrategyequilibrium(SMPSE),
which is deﬁned as b() such that i (ti;b(ti);b()) > i (ti;;b()) for all  and
ti. The usual deﬁnition requires this inequality to be true only for almost all ti.
This stronger deﬁnition creates no problems and makes some statements simpler,
such as those about the differentiability and continuity of the equilibrium bid-
ding function (otherwise, such properties should be qualiﬁed by the expression
“almost everywhere”). Finally, under our assumptions, the second price auction
always has a SMPSE in a weakly dominant strategy, which is b(ti) = ti.





[0;1]. It is also useful to assume n = 2, but this is not necessary for most of the
results. We also assume risk neutrality, i.e., u(x) = x. Thus, unless otherwise
stated, the results will be presented under the following setup:
5BASIC SETUP: Therearen = 2riskneutralsbidders(u(x) = x), withprivate
values distributed according to a symmetric density function f : [0;1]
2 ! R+.
Afﬁliation is formally deﬁned as follows.6
Deﬁnition 2.1 The density function f :

t;t
n ! R+ is afﬁliated if f (t)f (t0) 6
f (t ^ t0)f (t _ t0), where t ^ t0 = (minft1;t0
1g;:::;minftn;t0
ng) and t _ t0 =
(maxft1; t0
1g; :::; maxftn; t0
ng).
It is useful to introduce the following notation: D will denote the set of all
densities:
D  ff : [0;1]




The set of all continuous densities will be denoted C and A will denote the set of
afﬁliated (continuous or not) densities.
3 Positive dependence notions
Afﬁliation was introduced through the positive dependence intuition: “a high
value of one bidder’s estimate makes high values of the others’ estimates more
likely” (Milgrom and Weber (1982a, p. 1096)). This intuition is very appealing,
because positive dependence describes a circumstance likely to happen in the real
world. In fact, many authors introduce afﬁliation through this intuition or some of
its variations.
Afﬁliation captures this intuition, as we illustrate in Figure 1, below. Afﬁlia-
tion requires that the product of weights at points (x0;y0) and (x;y) (where both
values are high or both are low) be greater than the product of weights at (x;y0)
and (x0;y) (where they are high and low, alternatively). In other words, the distri-
bution puts more weight on the points in the diagonal than outside it.
6Afﬁliation is equivalent to MLRP in the particular case of two variables with density function.









Figure 1 — The pdf f is afﬁliated if x 6 x0 and y 6 y0
imply f (x;y0)f (x0;y) 6 f (x0;y0)f (x;y).
However, as long as we are interested in positive dependence, as this intuition
suggests, afﬁliation is not the only deﬁnition available. In the statistical literature
many concepts have been proposed to correspond to the notion of positive depen-
dence. For simplicity, let us consider only the bivariate case and assume that the
two real random variables X and Y have joint distribution F and strictly positive
density function f. The following concepts are formalizations of the notion of
positive dependence for X and Y :7
Property I — X and Y are positively correlated (PC) if cov(X;Y ) > 0:
Property II — X and Y are said to be positively quadrant dependent (PQD)
if for all non-decreasing functions g and h, cov(g (X);h(Y )) > 0.
Property III — The real random variables X and Y are said to be associated
(As) if for all non-decreasing functions g and h, cov(g (X;Y );h(X;Y )) > 0.
Property IV — Y is said to be left-tail decreasing in X (denoted LTD(Y jX))
if for all y, the function x 7! Pr[Y 6 yjX 6 x] is non-increasing in x. X and Y
satisfy Property IV if LTD(Y jX) and LTD(XjY ).
Property V — Y is said to be positively regression dependent on X (denoted
PRD(Y jX)) if Pr[Y 6 yjX = x] = F (yjx) is non-increasing in x for all y. X
and Y satisfy Property V if PRD(Y jX) and PRD(XjY ).8
7Most of the concepts can be properly generalized to multivariate distributions. See, for exam-
ple, Lehmann (1966) and Esary, Proschan, and Walkup (1967). The hypothesis of strictly positive
density function is made only for simplicity.
8This property is also known as monotonicity in the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance sense.
7Property VI — Y is said to be Inverse Hazard Rate Decreasing in X (denoted
IHRD(Y jX))if
F(yjx)
f(yjx) isnon-increasinginxforally, wheref (yjx) isthepdfofY
conditional to X. X and Y satisfy Property VI if IHRD(Y jX) and IHRD(XjY ).
Since there are many alternative deﬁnitions of positive dependence, a natural
question is: “How do such deﬁnitions compare with afﬁliation?” The following
theorem provides the answer.9
Theorem 3.1 Let afﬁliation be Property VII. Then,
(V II) ) (V I) ) (V ) ) (IV ) ) (III) ) (II) ) (I);
and all implications are strict.
The main contribution of this theorem is around properties V II (afﬁliation),
V I and V (ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance), which are the most usual properties
in economics. While Milgrom and Weber have proved V II ) V I, we were
not able to ﬁnd a reference for the implication V I ) V . The counterexamples
V I 6) V II and V 6) V I are also important, since some confusion may arise
with respect to the ranking of these properties.10 Moreover, we are not aware of
such counter-examples in the literature.
This theorem also sets the stage for our main problem. Since afﬁliation is just
the strongest positive dependence property, could Milgrom and Weber choose a
weaker property to get their results? As we shall see, the answer will be in the
negative.
4 Afﬁliation’simplicationsandpositivedependence
Afﬁliation has been used in the proof of many results. These results can be classi-
ﬁed in two groups: facts that are already true for the independent case (afﬁliation
9For this theorem, we used only seven concepts for simplicity. Yanagimoto (1972) deﬁnes
more than thirty concepts of positive dependence and, again, afﬁliation is the most restrictive of
all but one.
10 A casual reader may think that Milgrom (1981a, Proposition 1) states that V is equivalent
to V II and Riley (1988, Lemma 1) claims that a strict version of properties IV and V implies
property V I. However, this is not the case—the mentioned results are formally correct. Theorem
3.1 helps to appreciate the subtle aspect of their claims.
8allows a generalization) and predictions that are qualitatively different from the
case of independence. In this section, we will focus on one implication for each
of these groups.
The ﬁrst one is the existence of symmetric monotonic pure strategy equilib-
rium (SMPSE) for ﬁrst price auctions, generalized from independence to afﬁli-
ation. The second one is the revenue ranking of auctions: under afﬁliation, the
English and the second-price auction give expected revenue at least as high as the
ﬁrst price auction (a fact that we denote by R2 > R1). This last result is in contrast
with the case of independence, where the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET)
implies the equality of the expected revenues (R2 = R1).11;12 Both implications
were obtained by Milgrom and Weber (1982a) and I chose them because of their
importance. The purpose of this section is to verify whether these implications
(existence of SMPSE and R2 > R1) are true in a more general setting.
4.1 Equilibrium existence
Is the existence of SMPSE true under other deﬁnitions of positive dependence (see
section 3)? Theorem 4.1 below shows that the following property is sufﬁcient:13
Property VI0 — The joint (symmetric) distribution of X and Y satisfy Prop-
erty VI0 if for all x;x0 and y in [0;1],












support). Thus, the question becomes whether or not it is possible to generalize
the existence of SMPSE for Property V or even further.
If we deﬁne (x;y) = (x   b(y))F (yjx), where b() is a candidate for
symmetric equilibrium,14 then equilibrium existence is equivalent to (x;x) >
(x;y). Since b() is monotonic, one may conjecture that the monotonicity of
11Since afﬁliation contains independence as a special case, the results can be qualitatively dif-
ferent, but must have a logic overlap.
12Both the revenue ranking under afﬁliation and the RET requires symmetry, risk neutrality and
the same payoff by the lowest type of bidders.
13Motivated by an earlier version of this paper, Monteiro and Moreira (2006) obtained other
generalizations of equilibrium existence for non-afﬁliated variables. Their results are not directly
related to positive dependence properties.
14This candidate is increasing and unique, as we can show using standard arguments. See
Maskin and Riley (1984) or de Castro (2008).
9F (yjx) — as Property V assumes — may be sufﬁcient for equilibrium existence,
through some single crossing arguments (as in Athey (2001)). Since Property V is
still a strong property of positive dependence, this conjecture may be considered
reasonable. In fact, the reader may think that the following recent result by van
Zandt and Vives (2007) actually proves that ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance is
sufﬁcient for equilibrium existence in auctions:
Theorem (van Zandt and Vives, 2007): Assume that for each player i:
1. the utility function is supermodular in the own player’s action ai, has in-
creasing differences in (ai;a i), and has increasing differences in (ai;t);
and
2. the beliefs mapping pi : Ti ! Mi is increasing in the ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance partial order.
Then there exist a greatest and a least Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and each one
is in monotone strategies.
Despite these compelling reasons, the conjecture that Property V is sufﬁcient
for equilibrium existence in auctions is actually false; the following theorem clar-
iﬁes that SMPSE existence does not generalize beyond Property VI’.15
Theorem 4.1 If f : [0;1]
2 ! R satisﬁes Property VI0, there is a SMPSE. Never-
theless, Property V is not sufﬁcient for the existence of SMPSE.
This theorem shows that the rationale for existence of SMPSE existence for
Property V do not survive a formalization of the result. Simply, Property V is not
strong enough to control the equilibrium inequality (x;x) > (x;y) for every
pair of points (x;y).
4.2 Revenue ranking
The next implication—R2 > R1—is also an inequality, but it is an inequality over
expected values, not speciﬁc realizations. For some realizations of the variables,
15van Zandt and Vives (2007)’s main result does not apply because even simple auctions with 2
players and private-values do not satisfy one of their assumptions (increasing differences). In fact,
if ti > a0
j > a0
i > aj > ai then (ti   a0
i)1[a0
i>a0
j]   (ti   a0
i)1[a0
i>aj] =  (ti   a0
i) < 0 while
(ti ai)1[ai>a0
j] (ti ai)1[ai>aj] = 0, to the contrary of the increasing differences requirement.
10the second-price auction can give less revenue than the ﬁrst-price auction, but
for the inequality R2 > R1 to be true is sufﬁcient that the opposite happens on
average. Since this is a statement about average cases, one could expect that the
revenuerankingR2 > R1 wouldbestableacrossthecasesofpositivedependence.
There is yet another way of reaching the same conclusion: it is the intuition
for the revenue ranking R2 > R1, which is a contribution of Klemperer (2004,
p.48-9):
[In a ﬁrst-price auction, a] player with value v + dv who makes
the same bid as a player with a value of v will pay the same price as a
player with a value of v when she wins, but because of afﬁliation she
will expect to win a bit less often [than in the case of independence].
That is, her higher signal makes her think her competitors are also
likely to have higher signals, which is bad for her expected proﬁts.
But things are even worse in a second-price afﬁliated private-
values auction for the buyer. Not only does her probability of win-
ning diminish, as in the ﬁrst-price auction, but her costs per victory
are higher. This is because afﬁliation implies that contingent on her
winning the auction, the higher her value the higher expected second-
highest value which is the price she has to pay. Because the person
with the highest value will win in either type of auction they are both
equally efﬁcient, and therefore the higher consumer surplus in ﬁrst-
price auction implies higher seller revenue in the second-price auc-
tion.
This intuition appeals mainly to the notion of positive dependence. Thus,
the intuition should lead us to believe that the revenue ranking is still valid under
weaker forms of positive dependence. Despite these intuitive arguments, however,
the following theorem shows that the implication R2 > R1 is not robust for other
deﬁnitions of positive dependence.
Theorem 4.2 If f satisﬁes Property VI’ (see deﬁnition above), then the second-
priceauctiongivesgreaterrevenuethantheﬁrst-priceauction(R2 > R1). Specif-
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More importantly, Property V is not sufﬁcient for this revenue ranking.
These results suggest that afﬁliation’s implications are not robust. This would
not be a reason for concern, however, if afﬁliation were indeed typical. It is nat-
ural, therefore, to examine more closely the settings where afﬁliation could be
expected to hold. The following section makes some comments about this issue.
5 Remarks about afﬁliation’s representativeness
This section evaluates how typical afﬁliation is from mathematical, economical
and methodological points of view. Subsection 5.1 considers a mathematical no-
tion of smallness and show that the set of afﬁliated density functions satisﬁes it;
in other words, afﬁliation is a restrictive condition. A common justiﬁcation for
afﬁliation in economics is conditional independence, discussed in subsection 5.2.
Since other sciences use afﬁliation, subsection 5.3 considers the methodological
reasons for this use and observes that they do not carry over into economics.
5.1 Afﬁliation holds in non-generic settings
In this section, we show that the set of afﬁliated densities is small in the set of con-
tinuous densities. There are two ways to characterize a set as small: topological
and measure-theoretic. Although it is possible to show that afﬁliation is restric-
tive in the measure-theoretic sense (see an earlier version of this paper, de Castro
(2007)), here we limit ourselves to the topological result, which is simpler.
Recall that C denotes the set of continuous density functions f : [0;1]
n !
R+ and A, the set of afﬁliated densities (continuous or not). Endow C with the
standard topology for the set of continuous functions, that is, the topology deﬁned
by the norm of the sup:
kfk = sup
x2[0;1]n jf (x)j:
12The following theorem shows that the set of continuous afﬁliated densities is
small in the topological sense. The proofs of this and of all other results are given
in the appendix.
Theorem 5.1 The set of continuous afﬁliated density functions C\A is meager.16
More precisely, the set CnA is open and dense in C.
The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix, but the main idea is sim-
ple. To prove that CnA is open, we take a pdf f 2 CnA which does not sat-
isfy the afﬁliated inequality for some points t, t0 2 [0;1]
2, that is, f (t)f (t0) >
f (t ^ t0)f (t _ t0) + , for some  > 0. By using such , we can show that
for a function g sufﬁciently close to f, the above inequality is still valid, that is,
g (t)g (t0) > g (t ^ t0)g (t _ t0) and thus is not afﬁliated. To prove that CnA is
dense, we choose a small neighborhood V of a point ^ t 2 [0;1]
2, such that for all




. This can be done because f is continu-
ous. We then perturb the function in this neighborhood to maintain the failure of
the afﬁliation inequality.
Maybe more instructive than the proof is the understanding of why the result is
true: simply, afﬁliationrequiresaninequalitytobesatisﬁedeverywhere(oralmost
everywhere). This is a strong requirement, and it is the source of afﬁliation’s
restrictiveness.
Although the restrictiveness of afﬁliation seems to be a “folk theorem,” it was
never stated or formally proven. Note that the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 may
be sensitive to the space and norm considered, that is, the result might be false
without the “right” statement, which indicates the value of formalizing it. Thus,
Theorem 5.1 (together with the measure theoretical result proved in de Castro
(2007)) ﬁll this gap in the literature.
5.2 Conditional independence
A standard way to justify afﬁliation is to appeal to conditional independence. In
fact, afﬁliation was originally motivated using conditional probabilities (see Mil-
grom and Weber (1982a, p. 1094). Conditional independence models assume
that the signals of bidders are conditionally independent, given a variable v (the
16A meager set (or set of ﬁrst category) is the union of countably many nowhere dense sets,
while a set is nowhere dense if its closure has an empty interior. Thus, the theorem says more than
that C \ A is meager: C \ A is itself a nowhere dense set, according to the second claim in the
theorem.
13intrinsic value of the object, for instance). Since symmetry is the same as ex-
changeability, which is the main assumption of de Finetti’s Theorem, some auc-
tion specialists seem to believe that de Finetti’s Theorem implies that conditional
independence holds in symmetric auctions without loss of generality. De Finetti’s
theorem states the following:
De Finetti’s Theorem. Consider a sequence of random variables X1; X2,...,
and assume that they are exchangeable, that is, assume that the distribution of




, for any n and any
permutation  : N ! N. Then, there is a random variable Q such that all X1;
X2,..., are conditionally independent (and identically distributed) given Q.17
Unfortunately, however, de Finetti’s theorem is not valid for standard models
of auction theory, even assuming symmetry. The reason is that standard auction
models consider a ﬁnite number of players and, hence, a ﬁnite number of random
variables. De Finetti’s theorem is valid only for an (inﬁnite) sequence of random
variables.18 The following example illustrates the problem:
Example 5.2 Considertworandomvariables, X1 andX2, takingvaluesinf0;1g,
with joint distribution given by: P(X1 = 0;X2 = 1) = P(X1 = 1;X2 = 0) =
1
2   " and P(X1 = 0;X2 = 0) = P(X1 = 1;X2 = 1) = ". It is easy to see
that X1 and X2 are symmetric (exchangeable). In the appendix, we show that the
conclusion of de Finetti’s Theorem cannot hold if " < 1=4.19
Thus, de Finetti’s Theorem does not imply that conditional independence is
a generic condition in symmetric auctions. However, even if we are ready to
assume conditional independence, this is not yet sufﬁcient for afﬁliation. To see
17De Finetti proved this theorem for the case where the Xi are Bernoulli variables. Hewitt and
Savage (1955) extended it to the general setting. The statement above is somewhat vague. A
precise statement is as follows: Let X1; X2,..., be an exchangeable sequence of random variables
with values in a set S. Then there exists a probability measure  on the set of probability measures
(S) such that for all measurable sets A1;:::;An,




18One can assume that there are an inﬁnite number of potential players in the auction, but for
some reason only a ﬁnite number of them actually participate. Then, one can apply de Finetti’s
theorem. However, this will be of course with a loss of generality.
19Example 5.2 generalizes an example given by Diaconis and Freedman (1980). They prove an
approximation version of de Finetti’s theorem for a ﬁnite set of random variables.
14this, assumethatthepdfofthesignalsconditionaltov, f (t1;:::;tnjv), isC2 (twice









for all i, j (see Topkis (1978, p. 310)). It is important to note that conditional




Thus, conditional independence is not sufﬁcient for afﬁliation. To obtain afﬁlia-
tion, one needs to assume (2) above, i.e., that ti and v are afﬁliated. In other words,
to obtain afﬁliation from conditional independence, one has to assume afﬁliation
itself. Thus, conditional independence does not give an economic justiﬁcation for
afﬁliation.
The fact that we are not able to ﬁnd a justiﬁcation in the general model of
conditional independence does not imply that it does not exist, at least in special
cases.
There is a particular conditional independence model where afﬁliation can
be reasonably justiﬁed. Assume that the signals ti are a common value plus an
individual error, that is, ti = v + "i, where the "i are independent and identically
distributed. Now, we almost have the result that the signals t1, ..., tn are afﬁliated:
it is still necessary to assume an additional condition. Let g be the pdf of the "i,
i = 1; :::; n. Then, t1;:::;tn are afﬁliated if and only if g is a strongly unimodal
function.20;21
20The term is borrowed from Lehmann (1986). A function is strongly unimodal if logg is
concave. A proof of the afﬁrmation can be found in Lehmann (1986, Example 1, p. 509), or
obtained directly from the previous discussion.
21Even if g is strongly unimodal, so that t1;:::;tn are afﬁliated, it is not true in general that t1;
:::; tn, "1; :::; "n; v are afﬁliated.
155.3 The use of afﬁliation in other sciences
As we commented in the introduction, afﬁliation is used—under other names—
in other sciences. Thus, a natural question would be: “Does the justiﬁcation for
afﬁliation in other sciences carry over into economics?”
Afﬁliation is used in statistics, as Positive Likelihood Ratio Dependence, the
name given by Lehmann (1966) when he introduced the concept, or in reliability
theory, as Total Positivity of order 2 (TP2) for the case of two variables, or Mul-
tivariate Total Positivity of Order 2 (MTP2) for n variables, after Karlin (1968).
TP2 is used when there are good reasons for adopting special distributions in some
problems, and thosedistributionshappen tosatisfy theTP2 condition. An example
of this can be seen in the historical notes of Barlow and Proschan (1965, Chapter
1) about reliability theory. It is natural to assume that the failure rates of com-
ponents or systems follow speciﬁc probabilistic distributions (exponentials, for
instance), and such special distributions have the TP2 property. Thus, the corre-
sponding theory of total positive distributions can be advantageously used. An-
other example of this is the use of copulas.22 If we assume that the distribution
is in a family of copulas that have the MTP property, then the use of afﬁliation’s
properties and implications is advantageous and justiﬁed by the choice of the set
of distribution functions.
In the case of economic models, especially auction theory, the random vari-
ables (types) represent information gathered by the bidders. There are some sit-
uations where we can assume special forms of distributions, but in general there
is no justiﬁcation for such assumptions. In fact, speciﬁc distributions are rarely
assumedinthetheory.23 Thus, thecompellingjustiﬁcationthatispresentedforap-
plications in reliability theory or statistics does not seem appropriate in economic
settings.
6 Related literature
Few papers have pointed out restrictions or limitations to the implications of af-
ﬁliation. Perry and Reny (1999) presented an example of a multi-unit auction
where the linkage principle fails and the revenue ranking is reversed, even under
afﬁliation. This result shows that revenue ranking is not robust when the number
22See, for instance, Li, Paarsch, and Hubbard (2007).
23McAfee and Vincent (1992) make a similar observation, when they note the “lack of any a
priori guidance about the appropriate distribution” (p. 512).
16of objects increases from one to many. In contrast, one of our results shows that
the revenue ranking is not robust even if we maintain the number of objects but
allow for other kinds of dependences. Klemperer (2003) argues that, in real auc-
tions, afﬁliation is not as important as asymmetry and collusion and illustrates his
arguments with examples of the 3G auctions conducted in Europe in 2000–2001.
Nevertheless, much more has been written in accordance with the conclusions
of afﬁliation. McMillan (1994, p.152) says that the auction theorists working as
consultants to the FCC in spectrum auctions advocated for the adoption of the
open auction using the linkage principle as one of the arguments: “Theory says,
then, that the government can increase its revenue by publicizing any available
information that affects the licensee’s assessed value.”24 Milgrom (1989) empha-
sizes afﬁliation as the explanation for the predominance of the English auction
over the ﬁrst-price auction.
On the other hand, the experimental and empirical literature show an amazing
lack of studies about whether afﬁliation holds or not. The empirical literature has
tested afﬁliation’s implication that the English auction gives higher revenue than
the ﬁrst-price auction, but there is no clear conﬁrmation of this prediction. See
Laffont (1997) for a survey of empirical literature on auctions. We are aware of
only three papers proposing tests of afﬁliation: de Castro and Paarsch (2010), Jun,
Pinkse, and Wan (2010) and Li and Zhang (2010). Those papers were motivated
by an earlier version of this paper. The available experimental studies investigated
only some of the implications of afﬁliation. See Kagel (1995) for a survey of this
literature. See also section 7 below for suggestions of future work regarding this
topic.
7 Conclusion: the need of new studies
As we observed in the introduction, there is no question that dependence is of
fundamental importance in economics. It is also clear that we have experienced
an astonishing progress since afﬁliation was introduced as a foundation for the
study of dependence by Milgrom and Weber (1982a). Almost thirty years later, a
critical reassessment of the assumption seems overdue.
This paper shows that afﬁliation imposes some restrictions that have not been
investigated in detail. The intuitive appeal of afﬁliation is clear, yet as demon-
24Note that this is not necessarily their main argument, since they mentioned other advantages
of the open auction, as “the bidders’ ability to learn from other bids in the auction.” McMillan
(1994, p.152)
17strated in this paper, there are other ways to describe positive dependence that are
no less intuitive, but that have very different implications.
Although we brieﬂy reviewed the experimental and empirical literature, the
scope of this paper was mainly theoretical. As we have seen, the respective liter-
atures miss comprehensive studies about this topic.
Experimentalstudiescouldshedlightontheactualdistributionofvaluesacross
individuals, controlling for the common knowledge.25 It would be very helpful to
develop methods to determine the values that people attribute to objects in an
auction and whether those values are correlated or not. With respect to econo-
metrics, an obvious need is to develop methods to test the afﬁliation of bidders’
values, controlling for the common knowledge (if this is possible). It would also
be useful to develop techniques to describe the kind of dependence of the bids in
real auctions. It would be very helpful to learn whether the kind of dependence is
different across different markets and how these differences can be characterized.
For instance, is there less correlation in Internet auctions, where the participants
are consumers with almost no interaction, than in auctions where the participants
are ﬁrms or professionals acting in the same industry? Yet another direction of
research would be the development of econometric techniques to deal with de-
pendence out of afﬁliation.26
It should be noted that the assessment presented in this paper is not a criticism
of Milgrom and Weber (1982a)’s important results. On the contrary, Theorems
4.1 and 4.2 can be interpreted as saying that they have found not only a sufﬁcient
condition for their results, but also practically the most general one.27
On the other hand, this paper tries to deepen our understanding of afﬁliation,
and how it relates to other aspects of positive dependence. Our results suggest that
substantive progress in this ﬁeld should require new approaches to dependence in
economics.28
25The importance of controlling for common knowledge is further discussed in de Castro
(2008). Experiments have an advantage in this aspect, because they can control for “unobserved
heterogeneity” that econometricians cannot.
26Grid distributions can be useful for this task. See de Castro and Paarsch (2010).
27Although we generalize their results to property VI in the particular case of private values,
this property is yet close to afﬁliation (property VII).
28 In this direction, de Castro (2008) proposes the use of grid distributions to study not only
dependence but also asymmetric priors in games of incomplete information.
18A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1 .
First, we prove that CnA is open. If f 2 CnA, then
f (x)f (x
0) > f (x ^ x
0)f (x _ x
0);
for some x;x0 2 [0;1]
n. Fix such x and x0 and deﬁne K = f (x) + f (x0) +
f (x ^ x0) + f (x _ x0) > 0. Choose " > 0 such that 2"K < f (x)f (x0)  
f (x ^ x0)f (x _ x0) and let B" (f) be the open ball with radius " and center in
f. Thus, if g 2 B" (f), kf   gk < ", which implies g (x) > f (x)   ", g (x0) >
f (x0)   ", g (x ^ x0) < f (x ^ x0) + ", g (x _ x0) < f (x _ x0) +", so that
g (x)g (x
0)   g (x ^ x
0)g (x _ x
0)
> [f (x)   "][f (x
0)   "]   [f (x ^ x
0) + "][f (x _ x
0) + "]
= f (x)f (x
0)   f (x ^ x
0)f (x _ x
0)   "[f (x) + f (x
0) + f (x ^ x
0) + f (x _ x
0)]
= f (x)f (x
0)   f (x ^ x
0)f (x _ x
0)   "K
> "K > 0;
which implies that B" (f)  CnA, as we wanted to show.
Now, let us show that CnA is dense, that is, given f 2 C and " > 0, there
exists g 2 B" (f) \ CnA. Since f 2 C, it is uniformly continuous (because [0;1]
n
is compact), that is, given  > 0, there exists  > 0 such that kx   x0kRn < 2
implies jf (x)   f (x0)j < . Take  = "=4 and the corresponding .





coordinates are equal to a  (a + ) and the last ones to be equal to a+ (a   ).
Thus, x^x0 = (a   ;:::;a   ) and x_x0 = (a + ;:::;a + ). Let x0 denote the
vector (a;:::;a). For y = x, x0, x ^ x0 or x _ x0, we have: jf (y)   f (x0)j < .
Let  : ( 1;1)











n. Deﬁne the function g by
g (y) = f (y) + 2 (y   x) + 2 (y   x
0)
 2 (y   x ^ x
0)   2 (y   x _ x
0):
Observe that kg   fk = 2 = "=2, that is, g 2 B" (f). In fact, g 2 B" (f)\CnA,
19because
g (x) = f (x) + 2 > f (x0) + ;
g (x
0) = f (x) + 2 > f (x0) + ;
g (x ^ x
0) = f (x ^ x
0)   2 < f (x0)   ;
g (x _ x
0) = f (x _ x
0)   2 < f (x0)   ;
which implies
g (x)g (x
0)   g (x ^ x
0)g (x _ x
0)
> [f (x0) + ]
2   [f (x0)   ]
2
= 4 > 0;
as we wanted to show.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is divided in two parts: the implications and the coun-
terexamples.
A.2.1 Implications
It is obvious that (III) ) (II) ) (I). The implication (IV ) ) (III) is
Theorem 4.3. of Esary, Proschan, and Walkup (1967). The implication (V ) )
(IV ) is proved by Tong (1980, p. 80). The implication (V II) ) (V I) is Lemma
1 of Milgrom and Weber (1982a). Thus, we need only to prove (V I) ) (V ).
For this, assume that H (yjx) 
f(yjx)
F(yjx) is non-decreasing in x for all y. Then,
H (yjx) = @y [lnF (yjx)] and we have







0)ds = 1   ln[F (yjx
0)];
if x > x0. Then, ln[F (yjx)] 6 ln[F (yjx0)], which implies that F (yjx) is non-
increasing in x for all y, as required by Property V .
20A.2.2 Counterexamples
The counterexamples for each passage are given by Tong (1980, Chapter 5), ex-
cept those involving Property (VI): (V ) ; (V I), (V I) ; (V II). For the coun-





1 + 4(y   x)
2
where d = [arctan(2)   ln(5)=4]
 1 is the suitable constant for f to be a pdf. We




[arctan2(1   y) + arctan2(y)]
so that we have, for (x;y) 2 [0;1]
2:
f (xjy) = 2

1 + 4(y   x)
2 1
[arctan2(1   y) + arctan2(y)]
 1 ;
F (xjy) =
[arctan2(x   y) + arctan2(y)]








1 + 4(y   x)
2
[arctan(2x   2y) + arctan(2y)].







which violates Property (VI). On the other hand,




arctan(2   2y) + arctan(2y)
 






[arctan(2   2y) + arctan(2y)]
2
21In the considered range, the above expression is non-positive, so that Property (V)
is satisﬁed. Then, (V ) ; (V I).
Now we will establish that (V I) ; (V II). Fix an " < 1=2 and consider the




k1; if x + y 6 2   "
k2; otherwise
where k1 > 1 > k2 = 2[1   k1 (1   "2=2)]="2 > 0 and " 2 (0;1=2): For
instance, we could choose " = 1=3; k1 = 19=18 and k2 = 1=18: The conditional





1; if x 6 1   "
k1
k2(x+" 1)+k1(2 " x); if x > 1   " and if y 6 2   "   x
k2
k2(x+" 1)+k1(2 " x); otherwise





1; if x 6 1   "
k1y










1; if x 6 1   "
y; if x > 1   " and if y 6 2   "   x
y + x + "   2 + k1=k2 (2   "   x); otherwise
Since 1 k1=k2 < 0, the above expression is non-increasing in x for all y, so that


























This shows that (V I) ; (V II).
22A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1.
The equilibrium existence follows from Milgrom and Weber (1982a)’s proof. The
counterexample is in continuous values, but using the grid distributions proposed
by de Castro (2008).29 Consider the grid distribution f : [0;1]2 ! R+;f 2 D4
deﬁned by:





















a11 a12 a13 a14
a21 a22 a23 a24
a31 a32 a33 a34







2:0797 0:5505 1:4000 0:2296
0:5505 0:6965 0:5504 0:2439
1:4000 0:5504 2:3395 1:8158











: m = 0 or
p = 0g is arbitrary. This distribution satisﬁes Property V but there does not exist
a symmetric monotonic pure strategy equilibrium. These claims can be veriﬁed
directly through tedious and lengthy calculations available upon request.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2.
The dominant strategy for each bidder in the second-price auction is to bid his
value: b2 (t) = t. Then, the expected payment by a bidder in the second-price


















b(y)f (yjx)dy  f (x)dx;
where b() gives the equilibrium strategy for symmetric ﬁrst-price auctions. Thus,







f(yjy)f (yjx)dy  f (x)dx,
29I was unable to ﬁnd examples with continuous variables without using grid distributions. At
some point, I believed that I have found one non-grid distribution example, but Robert Wilson
pointed out an inconsistency to me. I am grateful to him for this.
23from the ﬁrst-order condition: b
0 (y) = [y   b(y)]
f(yjy)
F(yjy). The last integral can be




























(y)F (yjx)dy  f (x)dx
In the last line, the ﬁrst integral is just the expected payment for the ﬁrst-price


































f (yjx)   F (yjx)

















f (yjx)dy  f (x)dx
Remember that b(t) =
R
[t;t] dL(jt) = t 
R









. So, we have
b
0















































 f (yjx)dy  f (x)dx;
which is the desired expression if we multiply by the number n of players.
For the counterexample, consider the grid distribution f : [0;1]2 ! R+;f 2




a11 a12 a13 a14
a21 a22 a23 a24
a31 a32 a33 a34







2:7468 0:0803 0:1195 0:0696
0:0803 0:3200 0:5271 0:1224
0:1195 0:5271 1:7814 0:5650




This distribution satisﬁes Property V (but not Property VI). Moreover, the ﬁrst-
price auction with this distribution has a SMPSE and a higher expected revenue
than the correspondent second-price auction (R2 < R1). Again, these claims can
be veriﬁed directly through tedious calculations.
A.5 Proof of Example 5.2.
Let p denote the probability of Heads and let  be a distribution over coins.
Then: Pr(Heads,Heads) = " =
R









(p)2(dp) = 1   2E[p] + ". Then,
1   2E[p] = 0, or E[p] = 1=2. This implies: Var[p]=
R
(p   E[p])2(dp) = R




4 = "   1
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